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“Pay for Promise” in Higher Education:  
The Influence of NPM on Resource  
Allocation in German Universities 
Michael Huber & Maarten Hillebrandt ∗ 
Abstract: »‘Bezahlung für Versprechen‘ im Hochschulwesen: Der Einfluss des NPM 
auf die Ressourcenverteilung in deutschen Universitäten«. Quantification as a 
way to govern by numbers has colonised all sectors of modern societies. In the 
German higher education sector, a Performance-Based Resource Allocation 
scheme (commonly referred to as Leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung – LOM 
for short) has steadily been developed since the 1990s. In an organisational 
context characterised by increasing international competition and internal dif-
ferentiation, universities and their regulators have embraced the notion of 
smart resource allocation through performance indicators. At the same time, 
the sector has historically been characterised by a traditional cameralistic re-
source allocation mechanism, where the interactions between the main finan-
ciers (state governments), and beneficiaries (universities) were underpinned by 
a desire to ensure continuity and predictability. Based on empirical evidence, 
we outline how the university has transformed from a bureaucratic public ser-
vice deliverer to an adaptable organisation that is supposed to learn from 
quantified information. This perspective allows for the discussion of quantifica-
tion as a contemporary steering mechanism. 
Keywords: NPM, quantification, German higher education, performance-based 
budgeting. 
1.   Introduction 
Over the last three decades, the governance of German universities has been 
subjected to different structural changes, many of which are undergirded by 
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processes of quantification. Espeland and Stevens (2008, 407) characterise 
quantification as the “production and communication of numbers”. In higher 
education, numbers and quantification are more narrowly associated with steer-
ing and management. Quantification should help enact core values in university 
governance, such as efficiency, flexibility, transparency or ‘steering at dis-
tance’ (Power 1998, 98-104; Shore and Wright 2000, 73; Espeland and Sauder 
2007, 5). This instrumental orientation of quantification to achieve governance 
aims is exemplified when performance is quantified in order to determine the 
allocation of financial resources among universities – using quantification to 
allocate resources to high performers translates into efficiency (Schubert 2008). 
We argue that quantification is not only a problem of putting things into num-
bers, but also what one wants to achieve with these quantified figures. In the 
case of this paper’s analysis, we see quantification as a phenomenon that opens 
up a new tool-box for governance inside universities. 
In recent years, policy studies of higher education in recent years have pre-
dominantly discussed the effects on organisations of new quantitative instru-
ments created to encourage performance and competition (Zechlin 2008; 
Fangmann and Heise 2008; Espeland and Sauder 2007; Minssen and Wilkes-
mann 2003; Strathern 2000). The literature on quantification, in turn, seeks to 
show how instruments like rankings or performance measurement systems 
create new forms of (self-) observation, often through social processes of 
commensuration and comparison (Espeland and Stevens 1998). It highlights 
either the dynamics of performativity and materiality (referring to the condi-
tioning character of respectively quantification instruments and their material 
aspects vis-à-vis their users) inherent in those instruments (Kurunmäki, Men-
nicken, and Miller 2016; Power 2015; Pollock and D’Adderio 2012). Alterna-
tively, some look at the reactivity and gaming behaviour sparked in affected 
organisations (Espeland and Sauder 2007; Hood 2006). These studies introduce 
important insights. However, they often have a singular focus on the effects of 
individual quantification instruments, and thereby omit these instruments’ 
interaction with other organisational transformations characteristic of universi-
ties, such as hierarchisation or budget cuts due to resource scarcity. Inversely, 
publications focusing on internal reform dynamics tend to pay only limited 
attention to the manner in which quantification enables and shapes these pro-
cesses (Hüther and Krücken 2013; Krücken, Blümel, and Kloke 2013; Jong-
bloed 2006). 
Investigating quantification, this paper focuses on the allocation of financial 
resources inside German universities, and how it contributes to the governance 
of universities. We challenge two central tenets underlying conventional ac-
counts of quantification. First, we contrast the assumption underlying much of 
the current literature that the new era of managerialism signifies the realisation 
of a relatively stable performance-based regime. Instead, we postulate that, 
rather than creating a new state of relatively stable practices, German higher 
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education reform has in fact resulted in a situation of ongoing change and 
evolving performance orientation beyond the ideas of the New Public Man-
agement (NPM). When we speak of NPM, we refer to a broad public sector 
reform ideology that has been on the rise across Europe in most public sector 
domains, including higher education (Schubert 2008). Second, we argue that 
performance-based budgeting cannot be fully understood without placing it in a 
wider context of transformation in the higher education sector, which includes 
(i) significant cuts in overall budgets, (ii) ongoing adjustments in German uni-
versities’ internal organisation and (iii) political decisions. When these struc-
tural conditions are taken into account, it becomes clear that instead of reflect-
ing a paradigmatic shift towards the ideas and practices commonly associated 
with NPM and quantification, many aspects of performance-based budgeting in 
German higher education in fact tend towards traditional, bureaucratic solu-
tions. In this sense, quantification does not fundamentally reconstitute higher 
education governance, but just rephrases established procedures. 
Thus, we ask to what extent an NPM-based governance logic underlies the 
current state of budgetary allocation models in the German higher education 
sector. We argue that universities, faced with the novel demands deriving from 
quantification in these budgetary models, have responded by developing inter-
nal organisational capabilities. In particular, we can discern a development 
from the NPM-like ‘pay for performance’ towards a strategy we label ‘pay for 
promise’. This pay for promise approach began to surface in German universi-
ties after 2010, and can be seen as a response to an unsolicited volatility in 
university budgets. We apply a historical perspective, which enables us to 
understand how current budgetary models evolve, what obstacles and limits 
they had to overcome, and the ways in which they are results of a layering of 
budget strategies (cf. Reilley and Scheytt, forthcoming): pre-NPM budgeting 
and performance-oriented models co-exist and interact with new coping mech-
anisms designed to control the impact of NPM-oriented budgeting instruments.  
We set out our argument as follows. In section 2, we discuss the notions of 
NPM and quantification-based budgeting, and the theoretical model that con-
nects them. Section 3 analyses the development of performance-based budget-
ing on the basis of an empirical case study of current-day budgeting dynamics 
in German universities. The findings of this account are discussed in section 4. 
Section 5 concludes our study with some remarks concerning the role played 
by quantification in advancing ideas and practices of NPM in the German high-
er education sector. 
2. How Numbers Steer Budgets 
The story of quantification is as old as that of the modern university. However, 
when university governance became linked to NPM reforms in Germany in the 
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early 1990s, the reliance on numbers took on an altogether different form. In 
Germany, NPM is perhaps most directly associated with reforms to budgetary 
systems, which were enacted across the various German Länder (federal states) 
from around 1995 until the early 2000s (Burkhardt and Quaiser 2005). Whereas 
previously, financial resources were handed out on a predictable basis of neces-
sity (see section 2.1), NPM has now replaced this cameralistic regime with a 
system of performance-based budgeting, which is commonly referred to as 
Leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung (‘Performance-Based Resource Alloca-
tion’) or ‘LOM’ for short. While the cameralistic regime allocated resources on 
the basis of estimated need for continuing local budgets, LOM focuses on the 
commensurability of performances and the comparability of these performanc-
es across universities, aiming at rewarding the ‘better performers’. This is the 
empirical frame within which we explore the relation between NPM and quan-
tification more closely (section 2.2). Afterwards, we apply the insights from 
this exercise to the case of current budgetary processes in the German higher 
education sector (section 3). 
2.1  Quantification and the Advent of NPM in Higher Education 
The literature on quantification has gained momentum since Hacking’s (1990) 
and Porter’s (1995) observations that modern societies increasingly base their 
self-observations on statistical numbers, developing managerial strategies that 
rely on quantitative signals to structure decision-making processes (e.g., Miller 
2001). In higher education governance, quantification forms a natural compan-
ion to NPM ideals. Ferlie and colleagues (2008, 335f.) discern the emergence 
of an NPM ‘narrative’ in higher education, and enumerate various ‘signs and 
symptoms’ of the presence of quantification; for example, the identification of 
prices for services offered in the higher education market, the introduction of 
tuition fees, the search for explicit ways of measuring performance at all levels, 
and the appearance of a so-called ‘Matthew effect’, by which the best universi-
ties are rewarded for their excellence while the worst are punished for their 
mediocrity (Merton, 1968). All of these symptoms seem to require, or at least 
invite, the introduction of numerical representation as a ‘common currency’ (cf. 
De Boer, Enders, and Schimank 2008, 37-40).  
Not all of these ‘signs’ apply equally across all higher education regime. In 
Germany, for example, fees have been abandoned (the last state to scrap them 
was Bavaria, in 2013), and the system is rather weak when it comes to the 
introduction of pricing mechanisms (cf. Fangmann and Heise 2008, 49). In this 
sense, the increased organisation around concepts of marketisation actually 
refers to the organisation of quasi-markets (ibid; Schubert 2008, 33). In the 
German higher education debate, quantification is primarily used to induce 
competition, reward the successful, and to link these programmatic values to 
self-observation (Schubert 2008). Moreover, the state no longer assumes full 
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responsibility for university budgets, but just oversees framework conditions 
‘at a distance’. This means that universities are given greater autonomy in 
managing their daily affairs and strategic choices, but are still held accountable 
for the performances that these choices yield (Jongbloed 2006; Shore and 
Wright 2000). To this end, processes of data collection, report writing, and 
evaluation move to the foreground. All of these activities are based on num-
bers, and feeding state regulators with a ‘cockpit view’ of the higher education 
landscape. 
Various authors observe that NPM also sparks reform within universities, 
notably leading to a growth of organisational centralisation and an increasing 
managerial role for senior academic staff (De Boer et al. 2008; Ferlie et al. 
2008, 335-6; Jongbloed 2006, 75-6). This complicates the apparently straight-
forward conceptual language of university reform. Principles of marketisation, 
for example, attain a wholly different significance within universities than they 
do between universities; and autonomy may refer to the university as an organi-
sation, or to its individual members (Schimank 2005, 365). Instead of manage-
rialism, ‘governance at a distance’ could unfold into forms of self- or net-
worked governance internally, depending on the degree of entrenchment of 
past legacies and current preferences (De Boer et al. 2008; Ferlie et al. 2008). 
Moreover, the effects of NPM-based policies on structural conditions inside the 
university remain uncertain. Individual studies however, suggest the emergence 
of perverse effects, such as a strong indicator-orientation, gaming, and a loss of 
intrinsic motivation among academics (e.g., Espeland and Sauder 2007; 
Schimank 2005). These contributions indicate that the effects of NPM and its 
orientation toward numbers does not only have be sought in the withdrawal of 
the state and in efforts to create a market of higher education. It could also be 
manifested inside the university. In order to specify the potential consequences 
of this observation, we turn to the role of quantification in budgetary allocation 
processes in higher education (Espeland 2016). 
2.2  The Dynamics of Performance-Based Budgeting 
Quantification is often connected to NPM through its role in enabling perfor-
mance measurement. The latter has come to play a particularly important role 
in the financial dimension of governance, where it shapes and modifies an 
academic understanding of performance that was traditionally defined in terms 
of mutuality (Scott and Hood 2004). Funding through the budgetary process is 
thus used as the lever to redefine performance. Indicators are used to allocate 
funds in an ‘efficient’ way, but they highlight only a few selected features of 
academic performance. As Miller (2001, 382) argues, “what is counted usually 
counts”. The underlying assumption is that performance indicators establish a 
feedback mechanism through which the higher education system becomes 
more efficient, effective, transparent, and fair. We therefore consider the budg-
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etary form an interesting site of conflict in which to study the relation between 
NPM and quantification. 
Budgets are one common way to shape and steer the development of organi-
sations (e.g., Wildavsky 1978). Budgets are drawn up to provide income and 
planning stability (Fangmann 2006, 56-7). Yet, they should not be mistaken as 
‘objectively’ neutral or fair: they may favour specific organisational activities, 
or seek to reward particular aspects of performance, thereby creating inequali-
ties or imbalances that highlight qualitative differences and encourage differen-
tiation (Jongbloed 2011; Fangmann and Heise 2008). The underlying principle 
of NPM reforms is to allow resources to flow towards those parts of organisa-
tions that meet overall policy objectives best. Such objectives can be manifold, 
and consequently, budgetary models must balance various aims. They must be 
robust and at the same time able to adapt to changing conditions. They must 
allow for a differentiated approach and at the same time be fair and ensure 
sufficient resources for all. In the case of German universities, an important 
object appears to be the creation of a more autonomous organisation that is 
capable of resource prioritisation, which can steer itself towards better perfor-
mance (Huber 2005, 394-5; Krücken and Meier 2006, 251-3). As universities 
demonstrate an enduring preference for stability and predictability, one of the 
central challenges they face lies in the management of uncertainties triggered 
by budgetary reforms.  
Quantification plays a pivotal role in this process. Although cameralistic re-
gimes use numbers to allocate resources as well,1 under NPM ideals, quantifi-
cation changes: in cameralistic regimes numbers mirror political decisions; in 
NPM regimes, numbers obtain a life on their own: performance is defined in 
terms of desirable organisational outputs, and subsequently operationalised in 
numerical indicators that guide university governance. The university is made 
to bear the consequences of the sum-total of its performance, leading, for ex-
ample, to a strong emphasis on hierarchy. This is exemplified in the strengthen-
ing of leadership roles of university rectors, vice-chancellors, and deans in 
areas previously characterised by collegial decision making (Hüther and 
Krücken 2013). Scholz and Stein (2010), in a principal-agent based analysis, 
argue that before the emergence of NPM, the university was an organisation 
with many principals and one agent. The agent, the central administration, 
reflected the ministerial bureaucracy, and was tasked with representing in an-
nual budget negotiations with the ministerial bureaucracy, the faculties as prin-
cipals. The principals were greatly independent from each other and were 
mainly concerned with local self-administration. With the introduction of NPM 
in the 1990s, this relationship was turned upside down: the central administra-
                                                             
1  Numbers as such have been integrated in higher education policy for far longer, if not since 
the inception of the first existing university, for purposes of bookkeeping (Schubert 2008, 
5). 
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tion became the principal and the faculties their agents, representing a hierar-
chical relationship more familiar to traditional bureaucracies. 
The discussion above may provide the impression that the introduction of 
NPM-oriented budgeting marked a transformation, which has been more or less 
complete, and stable. However, the higher education literature has identified 
numerous factors that undermine or complicate the success of such managerial-
ist reforms, among them scarcity, professionalism, welfare objectives overrid-
ing efficiency demands, and the simple fact that the higher education system 
meets a set of partially contradictory objectives (e.g., Ferlie et al. 2008). The 
German higher education sector has not altered these factors: resources are 
scarce, professional influence remains omnipresent (and constitutionally pro-
tected under Article 5(3) of the Basic Law) and, after years of political tug-of-
war, a consensus has emerged among German Länder to renounce student fees 
for all EU residents, thus cutting off an important potential source of competi-
tive financial resources (KMK 2015, 90 f). We therefore expect that attempts to 
introduce NPM-style performance-based resource allocation through state 
budgets are largely stymied by the weight of historical norms and commit-
ments. At the same time, its introduction in higher education governance cre-
ates a new situation by making organisational performance, previously beyond 
the reach of reform, both commensurable and comparable in quantitative terms. 
Managerial steering through internal mechanisms of performance-based fi-
nancing is a hitherto less explored avenue for research. It is here that our sec-
ond expectation comes in, which is that universities’ internalisation of the core 
principles of quantification in budgetary models leads to an internal response 
that follows its own dynamic, namely one we label internal resource competi-
tion (IRC). Here, too, quantified performance indicators may introduce instabil-
ity. We thus expect that universities’ internalisation of quantification-based 
resource allocation produces multiple, interlocking, and unforeseen conse-
quences. However, in contrast to much of the current higher education litera-
ture, we prefer to avoid describing organisational change in the normatively 
laden choice between remaining professional (e.g., Musselin 2007) or becom-
ing an organisational actor (e.g., Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Ra-
ther, we highlight that the university is an organisation that continuously devel-
ops in order to cope with new challenges – in our case those related to 
quantification-oriented budgeting.  
2.3  Research Design 
To investigate the extent to which evolving budgeting forms in the higher edu-
cation sector conform to the central tenets of NPM, we selected Germany as a 
single-case, in-depth exploratory study. Our case study serves to explore the 
possible dynamics of budgetary models that rely strongly on quantification 
(George and Bennett 2005, 80-1). The analysis focuses on the evolution of 
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quantification-based budgeting into the current model, which we label pay for 
promise. In order to shed light on this evolution, and its relation to NPM, we 
conduct a historical analysis that traces the influence of old budgetary legacies 
as well as new problems facing the university as an organisation.  
The outline of our empirical study is based on a review of empirically in-
formed literature on German higher education governance, most of which 
discusses the central aspects of budgetary model development. We also rely on 
documentary background information, such as government policy documents 
and budgets, as well as 10 original interviews with staff members in positions 
of university and faculty leadership. All interviewees work either in the central 
administration or inside the faculties and are closely involved in budgetary 
questions.2 
All interviews were conducted in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. We 
acknowledge that the focus on a single state diminishes the generalisability of 
the findings, as each German state operates a slightly different higher education 
policy, with its own budgetary system. However, North Rhine-Westphalia 
represents a disproportionately large case, containing roughly 17 per cent (14) 
of all universities, 27 per cent (768,840) of all students, and 21 per cent (€6.37 
billion) of the cumulative higher education budgets in Germany (Destatis, 
2017, 2018, most recent figures). Furthermore, non-systematic observations of 
the authors derived from ongoing research, as well as earlier research (Huber, 
2005) suggest that similar trends occur in universities beyond North Rhine-
Westphalia.  
The influence of quantification on resource allocation is elaborated on the 
basis of the experiences of faculties and university administrations with re-
source allocation in four public universities. These help illustrate how particu-
lar organisational dilemmas played out in real-life settings. For reasons of 
anonymity, no further details can be provided about the individual universities. 
However, efforts were made to include a cross-section of universities in terms 
of number of students, age, and relative budgetary allowance. These character-
istics are believed to make them broadly representative for the experiences of a 
large segment of German universities, highlighting the external and internal 
conflicts that arise in relation to resource allocation.  
3. Pay for Promise: The Emergence of Internal Resource 
Competition 
In this section, we analyse the role that quantification-based resource allocation 
has played in the realising of ideas and practices associated with NPM in Ger-
                                                             
2  An anonymised list of interviewees can be made available by the authors upon request. 
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man universities as well as on the historical process that led up to it. We set out 
by describing the historical trajectory, which shows how the IRC is the out-
come of a number of reformatory steps. We start by reconstructing the old 
legacy of the cameralistic funding structure, and the way it interacted with the 
subsequent turn to performance-oriented budgeting. This historical analysis 
reveals a mixture of traditional and novel responses to the challenges posed by 
the advent of NPM-oriented budgeting. It also highlights the ensuing scarcity 
and instability that gave rise to the internalisation of quantification-based budg-
eting. This system has generated income instability and resource scarcity, 
which universities needed to manage. Thus, in our analysis, we give emphasis 
to the current state of performance-based budgeting in the German higher edu-
cation sector. When adapting to the new flexibility they were given, universi-
ties generally did not copy-paste the ‘pay for performance’ strategy of the 
Länder, but rather engaged in a volatile form of perpetual budgetary experi-
mentation, which we describe as IRC.  
3.1  The Influence of Old Legacies 
Until the 1990s, German universities were characterised by a stable budgeting 
situation known as cameralism. Essential characteristics of this model are its 
system of annuity and a rather inflexible allocation of earmarked budget lines, 
called ‘titles’. These titles predefine activities and positions in detail and do not 
allow for the substitution of resources. The only task of universities’ central 
administration in this case is to collect demands, communicate (and in few 
instances, negotiate) them with the ministries, and to implement them in a strict 
way (Fangmann and Heise 2008). Numbers mainly record the use of resources.  
The cameralistic model was frequently criticised for several reasons. Finan-
cially, it left little room for experimentation or differentiation. The pre-set 
position structure made rapid adjustments to staff in light of external develop-
ments impossible, while its annuity system inhibited long-term investments. 
The fact that financial decisions were made at the ministerial level was inter-
preted as a further impediment to flexible and adequate allocations (Küpper 
2003). Moreover, the fixed resource allocation for specific activities (book 
acquisition, for example) meant that faculties often attempted to use all availa-
ble resources towards the end of the budgetary year (Kehm and Lanzendorf 
2006, 154). 
While these problems were lamented since the beginning of cameralistic ac-
counting, it was only in the 1990s that NPM introduced a (more or less) coher-
ent model3 to overcome these shortcomings. As such, the first ‘pay for perfor-
                                                             
3  In the German case, ‘more or less’ refers mainly to the regional versions of the NPM; each 
state developed its own ideas and features of new public management, highlighting specific 
features and suppressing others (see Hood 1991). 
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mance’-model (LOM) emerged at German universities. However, it did not 
substitute, but complement the cameralistic model. Overcoming the annuity 
and the detailed budgeting process between politics and universities, the new 
budget was critically defined by global budgeting. Consequently, it relieved the 
political arena of fine-tuning and long-drawn negotiations, and brought about 
the idea of a wider timeframe that should allow universities to plan long term 
(e.g., Kehm and Lanzendorf 2006). The organisational side of these reforms 
implied that universities should internalise the budgetary allocation conflicts, 
and delegate them downwards towards faculties and departments (Küpper 
2003). The central administration first appeared as arbiter between the facul-
ties, but legal decisions subsequently transformed it into a management de-
partment with its own strategic goals and ideas (e.g., Schimank 2005).  
Meanwhile, the underlying logic and structural imprint of the cameralistic 
model remained largely in place. For example, the LOM system was from the 
outset tempered by various tweaks to its design (respondent #5). In most Län-
der, the component freed for LOM was limited to specific ‘titles’, never 
amounting to more than 20 per cent of the total university budget. Meanwhile, 
various components such as salaries or operational costs were already deducted 
from the starting amount. This was because the system by which permanent 
faculty positions were funded remained in place upon the introduction of the 
LOM. Furthermore, in the spirit of previous consensual state-university rela-
tions, universities continued to exercise major influence on the determination, 
operationalisation, and weighting of the various indicators used for the state 
LOMs (respondent #3). In the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, maximum 
fluctuations from one year to the next were capped at 2 per cent; in practice 
however, fluctuations remained even more limited. Other volatility-avoiding 
measures included the avoidance of cumulative losses or gains over the years 
by the establishment of an annually recurrent baseline sum (respondent #2), 
and the averaging out of measured performance over the last three years (Zech-
lin 2008, 65). This has led some to argue that the LOM system is merely an 
inconsequential game, which professes the virtues of competition, but ultimate-
ly aims at preserving stability (respondent #1, #5). As one respondent argues: 
…everything gets calculated, but [universities] can only win or lose in home-
opathic doses. Nothing changes. It is a game of marbles. (respondent #3, state 
ministry) 
Budgetary autonomy formed only one component of the reform, however. At 
the outset, the global budget was linked to significant cuts in income. It also 
differentiated budgets into a basic and a performance-related pillar. In North 
Rhine-Westphalia, universities accepted the LOM law and budget cuts, in 
exchange for a promise: the higher education sector was to be left alone in 
further rounds of budget cuts (respondent #3). Illustrative in this regard is the 
fact that the number of fixed faculty positions, which used to be contingent on 
the number of students, gradually began to lag over time, leaving universities 
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systematically understaffed. Moreover, while additional funds for teaching 
activities or quality improvement (e.g., the Hochschulpakt (cash for additional 
study places agreement), and the Qualitätspakt Lehre (teaching quality agree-
ment) were created over the past decade, both programs are earmarked and 
temporary. This generates new challenges for the university’s central admin-
istration in terms of budgetary uncertainty. As one university managers stated: 
I may have more money than I had [10 years ago]. But in spite of this, I have 
not really become freer in the way I spend this money. And there are many 
things that I can only pay out of the basic budget. (respondent #2, university’s 
central administration) 
Our analysis suggests that the LOM system focuses particularly on routine 
operations, and remains relatively ineffective with regard to change or innova-
tion, except where additional money can be acquired. The overall annual budg-
et, however, is only marginally affected. Most of the resources are applied as 
usual out of necessity: the major structural demands – relatively consensual 
state-university interactions, pre-set positions, functions to be performed – are 
still inherited from the cameralistic model. The main innovation lies in the 
emergence of quantification as a method of determining the allocation of some 
resources. And it is exactly this innovation which the university turns to in 
tackling two new problems that are not necessarily inherent in performance-
based budgeting, but which certainly coincided with it: (i) resource scarcity, 
and (ii) the instability arising from a declining proportion of funds coming from 
the central budget. 
3.2  The Emergence of New Problems: Scarcity and Instability 
In the 2010s, the global budget model shifts the main locus of resource alloca-
tion. What was once an affair between the university’s central administration 
and the ministry becomes one between different university faculties. As a re-
sult, internal negotiations turn into a competitive struggle. Because of austerity, 
the effect of the new budgetary situation is harder-hitting than it would have 
been otherwise. Additional funds available to universities are either temporary, 
such as project funds from the German Research Foundation (DFG); they are 
scarce, such as funding under the national Excellence Initiatives: they are ear-
marked for specific purposes, such as the Hochschulpakt funds; they are for 
facilitating the growth of student numbers; or they are a combination of these 
factors, meaning they cannot be spent freely. It is in this context, in response to 
the structurally perverse effects of the performance-based budgeting system, 
that the IRC model has emerged inside universities (respondents #2, #7). 
The dual pressures of austerity and external demands for quantifiably de-
monstrable performance has presented universities with two possible ways for 
managing their income. They can either continue resource distribution with 
fixed percentages, or they can adopt a performance-oriented model for purpos-
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es of internal resource allocation. The former option would lead to broad cuts 
that undermine functionality in all parts of the university. The latter option, by 
contrast, offers the persuasive strategy of developing an experimental perfor-
mance-based model that can be tweaked for improvement; it also introduces 
competition among faculties. The performance-oriented model has the added 
benefit for universities in that it allows them to make individual departments 
and faculties responsible for their own losses (respondent #2). Universities 
began to consider what dimensions and quantitative indicators of performance 
should be included in their internal resource allocation models, all the while 
retaining a modicum of flexibility in their decision making (respondents #1, #3, 
#7). Many central administrations soon discarded potential indicators types, 
such as bibliometrics, teaching quality, or regional business and social impact, 
which were considered too difficult to assess across the entire university, or too 
volatile to be implementable. Hence, the first step in a process towards a pay 
for promise model was simplification: the main legally defined functions of 
universities – teaching and research – needed to be accounted for through a 
manageably small set of indicators.  
3.3  IRC: Product of Old Legacies and New Problems 
Within the original LOM system, teachers and researchers remained relatively 
disconnected at the individual level. The amount of redistributed resources, 
which were largely symbolic in character, hardly motivated them to change 
their behaviour (Minssen and Wilkesmann 2003). This changed with the emer-
gence of the IRC system, which markedly affected actors’ roles and opportuni-
ty structures inside the university. This system is characterised by the emer-
gence of an increasingly influential administrative centre, which incentivises 
faculties to present plans on how to gain additional funds – usually on the basis 
of (partly-) quantified promises of performance. Faculty plans often take the 
form of (binding or non-binding) performance contracts with explicit targets, 
which are then the subject of negotiations between faculties and central admin-
istration. Performance indicators provided by external actors, such as the state 
(e.g., the North Rhine-Westphalian and its Analyseraster (‘analytical grid’), or 
the DFG and its so-called Förderatlas (‘research funding atlas’), provide focal 
points in such discussions. The new tasks of internal negotiations and the injec-
tion of accountability, lead to the introduction of new information technologies. 
Designed to collect and analyse performance data, these technologies also 
demand new administrative personnel (respondents #2, #7). The growing im-
portance of an administrative centre, which was already significant from an 
external perspective (e.g., in support for large state funding or project applica-
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tions), has now been projected inward.4 Meanwhile, bodies of university self-
governance are weakened; in some cases, the roles of these entities have been 
transformed, from co-decisional to consultative. A role reversal thus occurs in 
which the central administration turns from agent into principal (Scholz and 
Stein 2010). 
The broad contours of the trend towards an IRC system align with the inten-
tions underlying the LOM system: universities are beginning to fill in their 
newly granted autonomy with strategic decision making. However, it also has 
unforeseen consequences, of which we will highlight two examples. The first is 
the emergence of interdepartmental competition and mutual monitoring. Alt-
hough faculties have retained a degree of autonomy, under IRC, the success of 
one faculty challenges the financial room of the others. Loose coupling, some-
thing traditionally seen as key feature of the university (Weick 1976), trans-
forms into competitive, ‘tight coupling’. However, interdepartmental competi-
tion faces the obvious problem that the ways in the faculties can actually 
compete with one another are rather limited. Competition is oriented along 
crude divisions unfit for steering (natural vs. social sciences, research vs. teach-
ing). This means that the various parties continually struggle over the formula-
tion of common indicators of performance. In some cases, faculties compete 
directly, but on the basis of differentiated criteria (respondents #1, #2, #7), 
leading them to jealously monitor each other’s key performance indicators and 
annual funding. A second unforeseen consequence is found in faculties’ grow-
ing tendency to accrue large savings. This option is open for faculties, as funds 
no longer need to be used up within the year. As a consequence, however, the 
higher education sector reflects a paradoxical situation in which large pockets 
of self-inflicted austerity characterised by underfunded facilities, research 
projects and study programmes, are matched by large amounts of unspent pub-
lic money (respondent #6).  
The IRC distinguishes two sources of income for universities: basic funds 
and supplementary temporary resources, i.e., periodic block grants based on 
recurrent performance contracts with the central administration. While the 
basic and performance oriented budgetary lines continue to exist within the 
organisation, strategic funds emerge as a new additional budgetary source. 
These funds are taken from the other two sources and handed out on a competi-
tive basis by the central administration.  
The strategic budget provides the administrative centre with the possibility 
to allocate often times up to 20 per cent of the overall budget, with the excep-
tion of certain earmarked funds, e.g., for library operations or rent of buildings. 
This 20 percent is distributed according to administrations’ strategies and prior-
ities, which substantively increase its influence, and invites a more managerial 
                                                             
4  Growth also means internal differentiation; e.g., university administrations today typically 
include an information management and strategy department. 
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form of decision making. The remaining 80 per cent of the overall budget is 
distributed in a predictable and relatively inflexible manner. This amount is, 
however, insufficient for faculties if they are going to cover their costs and thus 
bring about the level of performance expected by external actors.5 The univer-
sities’ central administrations thus apply a strategy for the allocation of strate-
gic funds that is first and foremost focused on the need to provide minimal 
output across faculties; and secondly and more interestingly, this strategy is 
focused on faculty-specific and strategically relevant investments creating 
additional income through overhead budgets. 
Decisions on the application of funds frequently rely on quantitative indica-
tors of prospective successes, which are reinforced with examples of retrospec-
tive performances, such as numbers of persons (to be) reached with a confer-
ence, publications (to be) produced, or external funds (to be) attracted with a 
strong proposal (respondents #2, #7). This creates a dynamic which can be 
described as ‘pay for promise’ – money is allocated according to future expec-
tations of success instead of measurable success. The pay for promise model 
builds its aspirational narrative of impact, excellence, and competition around 
numerical indicators. In practice, however, it goes beyond pure quantification. 
One of its central characteristics is constant experimentation: 
For a number of years, we had a system that focused on support money in the 
application process. [...] However, when the evaluation [of the system] came, 
we were surprised and sobered how little effect it actually had. [...] And then 
the idea of a post-success premium came up. [...] We tried the one thing for 
several years. That did not have the desired effect, and so we tried out the oth-
er thing. (respondent #2, university’s central administration, emphasis added) 
The newly gained managerial powers of the central administration have 
emerged in a situation where they may be overwhelmed, and requires them to 
cooperate closely with academic professionals. Organisational reforms thus 
require a form of decision making that is both strategic and consensual. Impos-
ing central strategies on professionals seems futile:  
The university leadership is a political institution, right? [...] They can only 
ever reach something when they have the overwhelming majority of faculties 
behind them. [...] There are a few university administrations who have tried 
[to push through unpopular financial reforms]. They paid a high price [...]. (re-
spondent #3, state ministry) 
Thus, the political nature of strategic allocations demands more flexible forms 
of number-oriented control than hard, formulaic quantification would allow for. 
Project-specific evaluations, the use of IT models to analyse information, and 
                                                             
5  It is important to notice that the state allocations are linked to expectations that the uni-
versity is autonomous in the choice of the means it uses to meet certain performance goals. 
The leeway between state expectations and university strategies is not clear, neither practi-
cally nor legally. This constitutes a problem that will occupy the sector over the next years. 
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new coordinating arenas, provide the central administration with the necessary 
means to establish a control regime. This regime binds the central and faculty 
levels tightly together on the basis of ‘softer’, but continuous performance 
measurement (respondent #1). Although this resource allocation model clearly 
asserts the primacy of a central administration over faculties, it is based on 
negotiations and sparks unforeseen responses. For example, faculties, now cast 
against one another in a form of competition for strategic resources, engage in 
processes of mutual observation through performance indicators. Meanwhile, 
underperforming faculties turn into ‘disposable budget titles’ in the central 
administration’s search for an efficient resource allocation model (respondents 
#6, #7). Savings are realised through the underfinancing of faculties in univer-
sities’ central budgets, and in managing a multitude of discretionary funds held 
by faculties and individual researchers (respondents #3, #6). Such savings seem 
to be substantial across faculties, universities and the sector. One respondent 
even estimated that they constitute roughly one full annual budget for their 
university (respondent #6). Given this volume, it could be assumed that they 
are economically irrational (and politically risky); they emerge out of organisa-
tional uncertainty manifested at different levels of the university, and seem to 
be mutually reinforcing. 
These new strategic elements of resource-allocation within the university 
and their effects first emerged in German universities around 2010. It was 
around this time university administrations were forced to develop negotiated 
solutions. The processes that unfold add another layer to the performance-
oriented funding of universities. In the following section we discuss this new 
development in more depth. 
4. Quantified Budgeting: Layers of Hybrid Managerialism 
In the previous section, we have described the historical trajectory that in re-
cent years led German public universities to adopt an IRC system. This system 
is characterised by a budgetary allocation model of ‘pay for promise’, whereby 
faculties and individual researchers compete for scarce resources on the basis 
of flexible and continually changing quantified performance criteria. In this 
section, we explore the extent to which the current system is underpinned by an 
NPM-based governance logic, and what role quantification plays in this regard. 
First, we consider to what extent the budgetary reform process aligns with the 
logic of NPM (section 4.1). Second, we consider the role played by quantifica-
tion in the change process (section 4.2).  
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4.1 Higher Education Budgeting Reform as an Expression of 
Managerialism  
To what extent do the evolving budgeting forms in the higher education sector 
conform to the central tenets of NPM? The advent of the LOM system in the 
1990s, and the successive IRC system in 2010, were intended to radically over-
haul the resource allocation process. NPM-oriented innovations are visible in 
this regard: there has been a shift towards ‘steering at a distance’ (by replacing 
title budgeting with a global budget), accountability on the basis of explicit 
criteria (the LOM’s performance indicators), and the institutionalisation of the 
‘Matthew effect’ (allocation of funds to ‘winners’); and all of these develop-
ments aim to improve the system’s overall efficiency. Moreover, central uni-
versity administrations attained an increasingly managerial role by assuming 
control of the efficient allocation of resources. These features of NPM shape 
the reform of German universities. Even if market-creating instruments, such as 
tuition fees or pricing of individual aspects of higher education, did not attain a 
prominent role in Germany, NPM has still shaped reform processes. 
Although the LOM system reveals a strong NPM orientation in design, in 
practice, there are several limits to this approach which become apparent. From 
the outset, only a very limited proportion of the state budget was allocated 
according to principles of competition. No more than 20 per cent of the overall 
flexible budget was detracted after costs of library, heating, or maintenance 
were discounted. Moreover, over time, the budgetary system grew in complexi-
ty through the successive layering of instruments and ‘principles’. The current 
budget not only contains a basic income and a performance-oriented element, 
but also includes features that circumscribe its central principle – that of re-
warding performance – in order to shield the university system from financial 
shocks that would put its very existence at risk. This demonstrates how budget-
ing unfolds stability-seeking effects that largely outflank the new dynamics of 
competition and excellence propagated by NPM. The waning importance of the 
performance-based element in the LOM system is further evidenced by the 
introduction of indicators addressing societal-procedural, rather than organisa-
tional, output objectives. Significant in this respect is the introduction of an 
indicator for promoting gender equality in 2012. Finally, a further concession 
of the state to the competitive and efficiency-driven logic underpinning the 
original LOM system can be found in the parallel introduction of temporary 
project-based funds, which were added, often on an input-basis, to the competi-
tively allocated budget.  
Thus, the way in which university budgets have come to operate in recent 
years alters the LOM system in several important respects. Elements of the 
competitive resource allocation logic that characterised the state LOM system 
are now introduced in university (IRC) decision making. However, the two 
models are not necessarily coupled; instead, they tend to have distinct features, 
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weights, and foci. This is in part explained by the diversification of potential 
income streams – university administrations are increasingly responding to an 
amalgam of external financial incentives. The character of university-internal 
budgeting is therefore pivotally distinguished from the LOM system in that it 
increasingly orients itself to forms of flexible steering in what is considered an 
uncertain and ambiguous financial context. 
The new systems changed the orientation, from past performance to an in-
creasingly forward-looking perspective on resource allocation. Whereas the 
LOM system traces internal performance on the basis of past performance, the 
university-level IRC system, by contrast, seeks to steer faculties’ output by 
rewarding promised future performance. It prescribes performance in some-
times specific, sometimes general terms, indicates where (necessary) economic 
benefits could be gained, and flags desired behaviour in terms of commitment 
to competition or strategic aims. Thus, university administrations have devel-
oped a means to internalise and balance external expectations. As a result, the 
evolved budget allocation process under IRC lends the central administration 
greater autonomy. Initially, the administration’s role under the LOM system 
remained similar to the one it had in the former cameralistic tradition, namely a 
tool for bureaucratic control rather than managerial steering. Now, it gains 
leverage over faculties, but also assumes greater responsibility for the process 
of resource allocation. Consequently, it has moved beyond the role of inter-
locutor to act as a funder in its own right, with its own autonomous preferences.  
The IRC system negotiates prospective projects. The future-orientation of 
this task demands an expanded bureaucracy at the central level, which is capa-
ble of monitoring faculty and individual performances in real time. It also is 
expected to assess the degree of realism and ambition in proposed performance 
promises. The need to gather and digest the growing volumes of quantified 
information requires an increase in administrative capacity, both in terms of 
manpower and numeracy (e.g., Grendel and Rosenbusch 2010). The IRC sys-
tem creates more experimentation with potential organisational futures. Devel-
oping administrative capacity at the university’s centre thereby acts as a way to 
monitor the success of the steering methods employed, and suggests alterna-
tives that are potentially more efficient. In response to the development of the 
university over the past decades, the university appears to be transforming from 
a quasi-bureaucratic to a quasi-entrepreneurial organisation; the main challenge 
of this new entrepreneurship concerns the presence of multiple, partially con-
tradictory objectives. Budgetary structures offer avenues to funding that are 
partly competitive, and partly characterised by historical and societal expecta-
tions. These various ways of funding carve themselves into the organisational 
structures and procedures of the university. Thus, as historical sediments and 
budgetary needs of stability undermine the advance of a fully-fledged NPM 
reform, this process can only partially align with the NPM logic.  
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4.2  Quantification: Partial Companion to NPM 
The role of quantification in budgetary systems that conform to an NPM-based 
governance logic is often considered to be largely complementary. ‘Steering at 
a distance’ requires unambiguous output criteria that performance indicators 
can provide. Our empirical analysis broadly confirms this reading by finding 
that quantification forms a necessary condition for NPM reform in the German 
higher education sector. However, it is not a sufficient condition, in the sense 
that other preconditions must be fulfilled before NPM-based budgeting can 
function. Furthermore, we also find that in many cases, key performance indi-
cators play a hybrid role. In practice, they are partially implicit, constantly 
shifting, and inform decision making only in part. 
For the first time, the LOM system’s performance-oriented budget compo-
nent marked a desire to define and measure university performance, and to 
attach consequences to the measurement’s findings. In this sense, LOM indi-
cated a clear shift towards the reliance on quantification to achieve NPM-
oriented goals. Whereas previously numbers had also been tracked, these usual-
ly signalled production volumes (largely inputs), without any intrinsic value or 
self-governing mechanism attached to them. The LOM system now selected 
quantitative indicators for desirable performance, which identified achieve-
ments that could be compared with past performance and performances of 
other universities. LOM not only observed university performance, it used 
these numbers to govern and steer universities (and later their academic profes-
sionals as well).  
At the same time, in order for NPM-based resource competition to function, 
decision makers ought to see the ‘logic of the indicators’ irrespective of its 
consequences. This of course did not happen. From the outset, state-university 
negotiations about which parameters would be used led to the curbing of the 
LOM system. Caps on the competitive fund size and maximum annual fluctua-
tion were maintained in order to preserve the functionality of universities. 
Meanwhile, agreements were reached on the exclusion of certain budget ele-
ments from the calculation, such as building rents and fulltime staff salaries. 
Quantification can also be employed to counter potential competitive effects 
considered to be perverse. This is for example the case with the fulltime student 
equivalent (Vollzeitstudienäquivalent, VSÄ), where a weighted formula for 
differentiated payments is used to compensate for higher costs associated with 
students enrolled in the natural sciences. In other cases, quantification was used 
to promote societal values not typically associated with NPM, such as increas-
ing the proportion of female professors or migrant students. Finally, quantifica-
tion gradually emerged in budgetary instruments beyond the LOM. Some of 
these, such as university performance contracts, were prospective. This form of 
reliance on numbers, however, fundamentally altered the role of quantification, 
making it more flexible, indirect, and prone to the dynamics of negotiation.  
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In recent years, the growing diversification of performance information has 
been inaugurated with the advent of IRC. Central administrations’ newly ac-
quired autonomy enables it to evaluate, assess and decide on a more or less 
reasoned basis. The strategic information basis provided through quantification 
efforts forms the infrastructure that supports such decision making. The univer-
sity-internal IRC system signifies the first comprehensive effort at collecting 
detailed organisational knowledge about academic performance. As it is used 
for strategic purposes in a complex funding environment, indicators are over-
whelmingly future-oriented insofar as they are based on promises. Prospective 
performance systems can, however, as a matter of their nature, be quantified 
only partially. Out of the large pool of potential indicators on which agree-
ments can be based, new ones are constantly suggested, forming a starting 
point of recurrent negotiations between the central administration and faculties. 
In this sense, quantification forms part of continual consensus-seeking discus-
sions and can therefore hardly be characterised as ‘steering at a distance’. At 
the same time, quantification offers the central administration an important 
means to set the tone in a partially implicit manner. By indicating the possibil-
ity of modifying the allocation model in internal proposals, it provides crucial 
strategic signals for where it wishes to see change.  
Quantitative signals may also stoke competition in unlikely, unpractical, or 
undesirable areas. In the case of the IRC system, this is evident in the emergent 
competitive relation between faculties. The IRC system’s idea is to calibrate a 
given discipline’s performance to the average performance of all disciplines, 
after which individual as well as organisational performance can be readily 
compared and appropriately steered. The organisational need to compare disci-
pline-specific performances, which from a disciplinary viewpoint are incom-
mensurable, makes indicators more abstract and open to interpretation. This 
turns them into highly contested areas of intra-organisational conflicts. A func-
tioning performance-based steering model, however, presumes the possibility 
of an approach that does justice to all of the university’s faculties. Another 
example is Kieser’s (2010, 358ff) finding about the effects of performance-
based resources allocation: only that which is measured attracts resources, and 
thereby crowds out traditional professional performance; intrinsic motivation is 
substituted by extrinsic motivation. Addressing the perverse effects of NPM-
based resource allocation, which are enabled by progressive quantification, 
thusly remains a permanent concern. 
5.  Conclusion 
In this contribution, we outlined the evolution of financial management at 
German universities. We started with the juxtaposition of cameralistic ap-
proaches to the first elements of quantification in the form of LOM, which 
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subsequently became institutionalised in IRC. The layers of the three subse-
quent budgetary phases interact with each other in the sense that the IRC forms 
a recalibration in response to the shortcomings of the initial reforms. The LOM 
turns universities into organisations that need to administer actively the re-
sources that come their way, and do so through pay for performance schemes. 
Under conditions of scarcity, they start to save. As a consequence, new mana-
gerial forms are developed; these are less competitive, but put considerable 
bureaucratic and negotiating pressures on universities’ faculties and staff, as 
they have to ensure budgetary stability.  
At the outset, we asked about the extent to which an NPM-based governance 
logic underpins the current state of budgetary allocation models in the German 
higher education sector. We conclude that this question warrants a qualified 
response. After all, NPM-style performance-based resource allocation is critical 
to the development of higher education, yet remains largely stymied by the 
weight of historical norms and commitments. At the same time, it creates a new 
situation by making organisational performance, previously beyond the reach 
of reform, both commensurable and comparable in quantitative terms. Quanti-
fication and the selection of indicators played a critical role in the course of this 
strategic evolution – it helped resolve the paradoxical situation that NPM pre-
supposes organisational management, before performance orientation and 
competition can be implemented. The solution is to generate comparable data, 
which can substitute and automate management. Centralised agency slowly 
emerges in the university, where it has become taken for granted. Yet, it looks 
much less efficient and transparent than the change promised by NPM. 
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